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COUNTERPARTS IN MODERN POLICING:
THE INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE INVESTIGATORS ON THE
PUBLIC POLICE AND A CALL FOR THE BROADENING OF
THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
Sean James Beaton*
I. INTRODUCTION
One typically views policing as a function wholly governmen-
tal in nature. In recent years, however, public law enforcement has
been consistently reaching out to private corporations for assistance
in conducting investigations. This policy comes from public law en-
forcement's unwillingness and inability to confront the totality of
modem security needs. This failure has left a void that is being filled
by other groups known as the private police.' Private police have
been defined as "the various lawful forms of organized, for-profit
personnel services whose primary objectives include the control of
crime, the protection of property and life, and the maintenance of or-
der." 2  This definition extends to investigators acting on behalf of
some of the largest and most influential corporations in the world.3
. Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 2010. B.A., Uni-
versity of Hartford. This Comment could never have been developed without the help and
support of my parents, grandparents, and Marine Vorperian. Their encouragement, under-
standing, and love have put all my goals within reach. I have grown before their eyes and I
look forward to making them proud in the future. They have taught me that nothing worth-
while in life comes easy and hard work will always carry the day. I also would like to thank
my writing adviser, Professor Jeffrey Morris, for his tireless efforts throughout the writing
process. His dedication and knowledge is unparalleled.
1 Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49,
55 (2004).
2 Id Professor Joh's definition of the private police is extremely workable and her scho-
larship on this group has proven to be the most influential and reliable authority on this con-
sistently overlooked topic.
eBay, Trust and Safety, eBay Global Law Enforcement Operations, http://pages.ebay
.com/securitycenter/law-enforcement.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (describing the com-
position and goals of eBay's Global Law Enforcement Operations team, including the fact
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Some of these corporations were formed to provide security services,
but the vast majority of corporations set forth herein have business
objectives involving the production of goods and services wholly
separate and apart from the security industry. This Comment high-
lights the entanglement these entities have with governmental law en-
forcement and argues that their joint participation should lead to the
extension of the definition of who is acting under color of state law.
This extension will ensure that the intended protections in the United
States Constitution are not circumvented through the government's
surreptitious utilization of private entities.
This Comment first provides an overview of the constitutional
concerns that arise when the private police interact with criminal de-
fendants, and the even graver issues that are present when this inte-
raction also involves governmental law enforcement. Part III
presents an in depth look at private police, with some detail focused
specifically on corporate investigators who work in conjunction with
public law enforcement. After assessing this ubiquitous group, Part
IV harmonizes the private police and the state action doctrine. Be-
cause the state action doctrine has been classified as not being a
"model of consistency"4 and a "conceptual disaster area,"5 the analy-
sis focuses solely on pieces of the doctrine apposite herein. Part V
highlights the nexus theory of state action. The nexus theory has
been the most helpful to courts in dealing with cases where injuries
have been caused by both the government and private entities. Part
VI discusses and analyzes the relevant case law. The Supreme Court
has ruled on the constitutional status of the private police on two oc-
casions: Williams v. United States6 and Griffin v. Maryland. These
that their professional investigators continuously work in conjunction with governmental law
enforcement); Geico's Special Investigations Unit, http://www.geico.com/claims/claims
process/special-investigations-unit/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (providing an overview of
Geico's SIU division and emphasizing their continuous conjunctive effort with governmental
law enforcement to pursue perpetrators of insurance fraud); National Insurance Crime Bu-
reau, What We Do, http://www.nicb.org/cps/rde/xchg/nicb/hs.xsl/39.htm (last visited Feb.
27, 2010) ("NICB's mission is to lead a united effort of insurers, law enforcement agencies
and representatives of the public to prevent and combat insurance fraud and crime through
Data Analytics, Investigations, Training, Legislative Advocacy and Public Awareness.")
(emphasis added).
4 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S 614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing).
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966 Term, Foreword: "State Action, " Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69,95 (1967).
6 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
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decisions were rightfully decided, but the focus of the Court's analy-
sis has led to an arbitrary standard, which has created innumerable
inconsistencies among the lower courts. This Comment exposes
these capricious tendencies through an in depth analysis of lower
court decisions involving the private police and state action. Part VII
provides an analytical framework for subsequent case law to rely on.
The framework utilizes the strengths of the state action doctrine and
minimizes its weaknesses. Governmental law enforcement's in-
creased reliance on private sector resources, concurrent to modem
state action jurisprudence, should rightfully lead to a broader defini-
tion of who is acting under color of state law.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Private police conduct investigations, prevent loss, provide
testimony, safeguard property, and make arrests. Their employment
routinely includes interviewing, searching, and depriving individuals
of their freedom.8 Although private police make discretionary deci-
sions that greatly impact people's lives, they are not usually held to
the same constitutional standards as their public counterparts.9 This
differential treatment can be attributed to the doctrine of state action.
The underlying principle of state action is that the protections embo-
died in the United States Constitution are only applicable against the
federal and state governments.' 0 Any evidence acquired by a corpo-
rate investigator through an unlawful search and seizure, or obtained
through a non-Mirandized confession without the presence of an at-
torney, may be used as evidence against a defendant in subsequent
judicial proceedings. Essentially, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
378 U.S. 130 (1964).
8 See infra Parts V and VI.
9 See infra Part VI.
1o U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Stating in relevant part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction to the equal protection of the
laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
" See United States v. Francoeur, 547 F.2d 891, 894 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Such illegal con-
duct [by the private police] would not, however, give [the defendants] the protection of the
Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule which has developed from it.").
2010] 595
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Amendments to the United States Constitution do not offer protection
to potential defendants dealing with the private police.12  This has
produced an egregious practice that has been labeled "the new ver-
sion of the silver platter doctrine," where private police collect evi-
dence in ways proscribed to the public police, and then turn over the
evidence to the prosecution to be used during subsequent criminal
proceedings.13 By handing statements, contraband, or other evidence
over to the government on a silver platter, the private police and gov-
ernment are surreptitiously circumventing a fundamental principle of
constitutional law. To make matters worse, a criminal defendant
does not have the entrapment defense available to confront any incul-
patory evidence seized.14 This reality can have detrimental effects on
defendants who are confronted with evidence obtained by corporate
investigators through undercover investigations. For example, if in
an undercover capacity a corporate investigator elicits a non-disposed
individual to commit a crime, recordings of that conversation will be
admissible without the defendant having the entrapment defense
available to him. Introducing these recordings into evidence could,
very well, be the difference between a conviction and an acquittal. In
addition to the issues dealing with criminal liability, when a person's
rights have been violated by the private police, the individual will
likely want to recover civil damages. They will be disheartened to
discover that the Civil Rights Statutes, including § 1983, are unavail-
able to them.'5 The only remedy for redress will lie in state tort ac-
12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (concerning search and seizure); U.S. CONST. amend. V (con-
cerning grand jury indictment for capital crimes, double jeopardy, self incrimination, due
process, and just compensation for property); U.S. CONST. amend VI (concerning jury trial
for crimes and procedural rights). All of these amendments require the finding of State Ac-
tion before any protection is given. See also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475
(1921).
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and
seizures, and .. . itg protection applies to governmental action. Its origin
and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the ac-
tivities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation
upon other than governmental agencies ....
Id.
13 Under the original silver platter doctrine, illegally seized evidence by state officers
could lawfully be introduced against a defendant in a federal criminal trial. Joh, supra note
1, at 114-17 (describing the silver platter doctrine and its new version involving the private
police).
14 David A. Slansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1165, 1240 (1999).
s 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2009) ("[U]nder color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
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tions such as assault, trespass, wrongful termination, or false impri-
sonment. State tort actions against private police, however, are stri-
kingly rare and unsuccessful. 16
The United States Supreme Court has articulated a doctrine
that enables a seemingly private entity to be labeled a state actor for
constitutional and federal civil rights purposes.' 7  The doctrine con-
sists of the public function, nexus, and pervasive entwinement theo-
ries of state action.18 As this Comment demonstrates, under a theo-
retical examination of these doctrines, activities of corporate
investigators and other private police can clearly be attributable to the
state.' 9 However, in the last forty-five years, the Supreme Court has
continuously declined to review the constitutional status of the pri-
vate police.2 0 Further, in Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks,2' the Court ex-
pressly declined to express an opinion of whether actions of the pri-
vate police would be subject to the strictures of the Fourteenth
Amendment.22 The precedent that has been established in federal and
state courts in the area of private police is now antiquated, unsound,
and inconsistent.23 This Comment respectfully submits that a "nexus
plus" theory of state action jurisprudence will produce sound results
if utilized to confront the constitutional concerns that arise with cor-
porate investigators. Finally, this Comment advocates that legislative
action must be taken to confront the issues that arise when private se-
custom, or usage ... subjects ... any citizen .. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities, secured by the Constitution.) (emphasis added).
16 Slansky, supra note 14, at 1183, 1186.
17 See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622 (finding state action in a private litigant's use of a pe-
remptory challenge); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (find-
ing state action in a private restaurant's discrimination of an African American).
18 See infra Parts IV and V.
" See infra Part ViII.
20 See, e.g., Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 638 (6th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 946 (2006).
21 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
22 Id. at 163-64.
[W]e . . . note that there are a number of state and municipal functions
... administered with a greater degree of exclusivity by States and mu-
nicipalities . . . such . . . as education, fire, and police protection . ...
We express no view as to the extent, if any, to which a city or State
might be free to delegate to private parties the performance of such func-
tions and thereby avoid the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (emphasis added).
23 See infra Parts V and VI.
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curity personnel detain and interview suspects.
III. THE PRIVATE POLICE
A. Statistics and Concepts
Private police have been defined as "the various ... forms of
organized, for-profit personnel services whose primary objectives in-
clude the control of crime, the protection of property and life, and the
maintenance of order." 24 The private police will unquestionably be
more influential during the twenty-first century than many federal
and state law enforcement agencies. A 2008 study published by the
United States Department of Labor revealed that there are over one
million private investigators and security personnel, compared to just
over 625,000 public police officers.25 Other estimates state that there
are three times as many private police as there are public police in the
United States.26 Regardless of what empirical data is employed, it is
very clear that there are significantly more members of this pervasive
group than governmental law enforcement officers.
The most venerable argument against classifying private po-
lice as state actors is that these business entities employ investigators
and guards for their own private interest-not for the public good.27
The business of corporate loss prevention is helpful in ascertaining
the validity of this argument. In support of the position, UCLA Pro-
fessor Elizabeth Joh argues that the Macy's Department Store has no
incentive to prosecute shoplifters because of the protracted nature of
the justice system.2 8 The theory is that by resorting to public prose-
cution, which will inevitably entail the store detectives' to search and
interview subjects, and also provide statements and testimony, crucial
time will be taken away from their duties at the store. 29 The assump-
24 Joh, supra note 1, at 55.
25 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, May 2008 National Occupational Em-
ployment and Wage Estimates 33, available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oesnat.htm#
b33-0000.
26 Heidi Boghosian, Applying Restraints to Private Police, 70 Mo. L. REv. 177, 191
(2005).
27 See Elizabeth Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 573, 591
(2005).
28 Id. at 590.
29 id.
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tion is that Macy's benefits more by partaking in "private justice,"
and in lieu of public prosecution, banishing the shoplifter from the
store.30
However, Professor Joh contradicts the validity of the theory
by addressing the fact that nearly sixty percent of the shoplifting cas-
es at Macy's in New York City are reported to the police.31  Before
the arrival of the public police, there is the very real possibility that
the shoplifters are taken to the store's private detention center,
searched with an indifference to probable cause, handcuffed, and sub-
jected to an interrogation process without being given their Miranda
warnings. Upon arrival of the New York Police Department, the
store detectives presumably hand a confession over to the officers on
a "silver platter." The shoplifter is then arrested, and processed at the
local precinct. This systematic degradation of personal civil rights
and liberties is inexcusable. Regardless of corporations' subjective
goals, the affect of corporate policies on the public are not merely an-
cillary or harmless, but instead can be profound and impacting.3 2
Through a judicial broadening of the state action doctrine for custodi-
al interrogations, or legislatively mandating store detectives to proffer
subjects their Miranda rights, the potential for these flagrant abuses
can be circumscribed.
B. Some Quintessential Examples of the Private Police
eBay, Inc. is an internet company that manages and operates
eBay.com, an online shopping website where people and businesses
sell goods and services worldwide.33 In addition to brokering the sale
of goods and services between individuals all over the world, eBay
provides another service: an immense, highly sophisticated, fully
functional, private police force that works cooperatively with public
law enforcement on a multinational basis.34 eBay's private police
30 Id. at 589-90.
31 Id. at 590.
32 See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Schneier on Security: Private Police Forces (Feb. 27, 2007),
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/02/private police.html (criticizing the use of
private police and highlighting an incident where an untrained Best Buy Security guard
choked and killed a fraud suspect).
3 See eBay Home Page, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
34 See eBay, supra note 3 (describing the composition and goals of eBay's Global Law
Enforcement Operations team).
2010] 599
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force calls itself Global Law Enforcement Operations, and "The
North America Fraud Investigation Team" is comprised of over eigh-
ty investigators, many of whom are former governmental law en-
forcement officials.3 5 Their webpage proudly displays a gold "po-
lice" shield, resting on top of a keyboard.36 Global Law Enforcement
Operations states it works in concert with governmental law en-
forcement agencies around the world to "pursue, apprehend, and
prosecute online criminals."37
Their investigations concern a wide array of crimes including
"merchant fraud, illegal goods," "bank and credit card fraud," and
"identity theft." 3 During a three month period in 2007, the investi-
gators' casework led to the arrest of ninety-seven criminals through-
out the United States and Europe. 39 The arrestees were "suspected of
committing over $1.2 million in crimes, both online and off."40 Other
undertakings of the North American Fraud Investigations Team con-
sists of training governmental law enforcement, initiating fraud cases,
and collecting, analyzing, and presenting evidence in criminal prose-
cutions.41 This often requires the professional investigators to oper-
ate in an undercover capacity, testify at trial, and interview potential
subjects.42 Keep in mind that your typical undercover investigation
involves the recording of conversations, which is a way of collecting
inculpatory evidence to be used at trial. Furthermore, similar to the
policy of governmental law enforcement agencies to release reports
of their activities to local periodicals and newspapers, the eBay web-
site maintains a "police blotter," which details cases in which the
eBay investigators "pursue, apprehend and prosecute fraudsters."43
3 Id.; See also Ian Wylie, Romania Home Base for EBay Scammers, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
26, 2007, at Cl.
36 See eBay, supra note 33.
3 See Mike Rou, EBay General Announcements (July 20, 2007), http://www2.ebay.com/
aw/core/200707201527132.html.
3 EBay, supra note 33.
3 See Rou, supra note 37.
40 id
41 See eBay, supra note 33.
42 Id.; see also Dan Goodin, Notorious EBay Hacker Arrested in Romania, THE REGISTER,
Apr. 18, 2008, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/04/18/vladuz-arrested/ print.html ("Un-
dercover eBay investigators closed in on Duiculescu by pretending to be interested in buying
one of his applications.") (emphasis added).
43 See eBay Security & Resolution Center, Police Blotter, http://pages.ebay.com/
SECURITYCENTER/lawcase study.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) (highlighting cases of
identity theft, car theft, and money laundering in which eBay Investigators "pursue[d], ap-
600 [Vol. 26
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The intention of the police blotter is to "share information with the
Community [sic] about [eBay's] efforts with law enforcement around
the world."" It is astounding that this corporation is partaking in qu-
asi-governmental functions to this extent without their investigators
being exposed to any formal legal or law enforcement oversight.
In eBay's most prolific success story to date, eBay investiga-
tors made multiple month-long trips to Romania with high ranking
governmental law enforcement agencies, working in an undercover
capacity, and dismantled an eleven member, multi-million dollar in-
ternet crime syndicate. 45 This "cross functional" investigation and
"arrest was due to a formalized collaboration between eBay and the
Romanian General Directorate for Combating Organized Crime, the
DIICOT and in cooperation with the United States Secret Service and
the FBI."46 The primary target of the investigation was a twenty
year-old Romanian hacker who preyed on credulous eBay users.47
Let us assume the investigators are working on an Internet
fraud case. eBay Investigator Spasova is conducting surveillance of a
known hangout, when a man who resembles one of the suspects
walks up to the surveillance vehicle and asks for directions. Suppose
eBay Investigator Spasova jumps out of the vehicle, displays her cre-
dentials and searches the man without considering probable cause.
She discovers a zip drive on his person that contains the identifying
information of 3,000 elderly Americans. The subject claims the zip
drive was not his, and says he was "just delivering something to his
cousin." Investigator Spasova brings the man back to a hotel and in-
terrogates him without giving Miranda warnings. He denies any in-
volvement, so she utilizes various torture techniques to garner a con-
fession about international identity theft, and turns the written
confession over to the FBI on a "silver platter." Subsequent to being
arrested, the defendant proclaims his innocence and refuses to bar-
gain with the United States Department of Justice. At trial, the Assis-
tant United States Attorney presents evidence of the zip drive and the
confession in a cogent and charismatic fashion. The jury convicts
prehend[ed] and prosecut[ed] fraudsters on ebay.com and paypal.com").
4 See id.
45 See eBay, supra note 33.
4 See Posting of RIBH to eBay INK, http://ebayinkblog.com/2008/05/14/the-arrest-of-
vladuz-a-team-effort (May 14, 2008).
47 Goodin, supra note 42.
2010] 601
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and the man is sentenced to fifteen years in prison.
Because of the private characterization of eBay Investigator
Spasova, the search and confession are constitutionally sufficient,
thus completely available to use for prosecutorial purposes. The de-
fendant will not be able to assert any Fourth Amendment illegal
search and seizure, Fifth Amendment wrongful self-incrimination, or
Fourteenth Amendment due process violations. Also, after eBay re-
vokes the defendant's account because of the suspected criminal ac-
tivities, he surely will have no redress for the loss of profits to his
business. Moreover, Investigator Spasova will not be liable to any-
one for § 1983 liability. This immunity is simply because she works
for a private corporation and not the United States government. A
broadening of the state action doctrine to include eBay and other cor-
porate investigators while working with governmental law enforce-
ment will mitigate these constitutional concerns.
This potential for concerted abuse of the public/private di-
chotomy is very real, and the coordinated effort between corporate
investigators and public law enforcement has been prevalent for
many years. From 1991-1993, the Federal Bureau of Investigations
("FBI") worked with investigators from the International Business
Machines Corporation ("IBM") on a multi-million dollar fraud case
related to the illegal sale of computer parts.48 In conceivably "the
largest industrial espionage case ever in the Untied States," IBM in-
vestigators created a bogus consulting firm called "Glenmar Asso-
ciates." 49 An IBM security official operated in an undercover capaci-
ty for months posing "as the firm's attorney. "50 While acting in an
undercover capacity, the IBM security official offered to sell stolen
IBM secrets to high-ranking employees of two other technological
giants, Hitachi and Mitsubishi.5 ' As a result of the undercover opera-
tion, criminal charges were filed against twenty-one individuals.52
Subsequent to the arrest of the subjects, FBI director William H.
Webster applauded IBM for its "excellent assistance rendered during
48 Steve Lohr, Company News; I.B.M Helps Parts-Scam Investigators, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 1993, at D5.
49 Gary T. Marx, The Interweaving of Public and Private Police Undercover Work, in
PRIVATE POLICING (Clifford D. Shearing & Phillip C. Stenning eds., 1987), available at
http://web.mit. edulgtmarx/www/private.html.
50 Id.
5 1 Id.
52 Id,
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this investigation." In a telling claim that demonstrates the amount
of ascendancy that IBM, a private corporation, had in a governmental
criminal investigation, the defense attorney for the arrestees "claimed
that the sting operation was controlled by IBM and was undertaken as
part of a struggle against international competition."54
Undercover sting operations pose procedural due process and
evidentiary concerns that may be circumvented through the use of
private investigators. Assume the undercover IBM investigator asks
to a non-disposed Hitachi executive, "Do you want to buy these com-
puter chips?" After some inducement, the executive agrees, and a
crime is committed. At trial, the Hitachi executive will not have the
defense of entrapment available to him. As long as the IBM investi-
gator was not deputized, not an agent of the police, and was not in-
structed to act illegally, he will not be considered a governmental ac-
tor; therefore, no entrapment defense is available. 5 The defense
counsel may have had a stroke of intuition, perceiving the IBM In-
vestigator handing the tape recorder to the FBI agent on a "silver
platter," when he claimed that the undercover operation was "con-
trolled by IBM." 56 The broadening of the state action doctrine will
go far in alleviating the likelihood for such aforementioned potential
abuses. Moreover, this relationship between both eBay and IBM and
governmental law enforcement epitomizes the quintessential, mutual-
ly beneficial, symbiotic relationship that underlies state action juri-
sprudence.
C. Shrinking Constitutional Concerns
At the heart of every business entity is the objective to keep
both its employees and customers honest and safe. Companies facili-
tate this goal by creating and managing a corporate security depart-
ment. They hire detectives, guards, and investigators to keep the
5 Jeff Gerth, Japanese Executive Charged in I.B.M Theft Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
1982, at Al.
54 Marx, supra note 49.
5 Id. (indicating that the obvious concern of what constitutes "agency" is open to interpre-
tation).
5 Id.; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, Ill, 125 (1984) (holding the
Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure inapplicable when de-
fendant's package containing cocaine was unreasonably opened by private Federal Express
employee and subsequently handed over to Federal DEA agents ); Job, supra note 1, at 115-
17.
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workplace safe, prevent theft, and maintain the overall integrity of the
business. Some corporate investigators interact with governmental
law enforcement on an expansive level." In most cases, your typical
store detective has little or no interaction with the public police. The
little interaction they do have consists of handing a customer or em-
ployee over to public officers for arrest processing. Due to the small
amount of intercommunication, many courts have been unwilling to
treat these corporate security personnel any differently than private
58
citizens.
The inherent prevalence of corporate security personnel to de-
tain, search, and arrest members of the public mandates that, in cer-
tain situations, they should be treated as state actors. One such situa-
tion occurs when a corporate store detective detains a customer or
employee and questions him. There is too great a potential for
coerced confessions and prolonged detentions without the protections
of Miranda and probable cause.59 However, without being deputized
or given special police powers, these store detectives are treated le-
gally in the same manner an average person would be when making a
citizen's arrest and handing a subject over to the public police.60
Therefore, victims are afforded no constitutional protections where
their injury was at the hands of these private security personnel. This
Comment advocates that state legislatures mandate that, at a mini-
mum, corporate security personnel furnish detainees with their Mi-
randa rights. This will assure that custodial interrogations result in
voluntary statements or confessions.
5 See supra Part III.B.
58 See discussion infra Part VI.
59 See Joan E. Marshall, The At-Will Employee and Coerced Confessions of Theft: Extend-
ing Fifth Amendment Protection to Private Security Guard Abuse, 96 DICK. L. REv. 37, 37-
38, 40 (1991) (examining the potential abuses that present themselves when store detectives
detain and interview employees suspected of theft). See also Curley v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (D.N.J. 1990) (discussing former employees' claims
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and state antiracketeering law
arising out of the conduct of loss prevention specialists who allegedly extorted confessions
and payments from employees suspected of theft).
6 From a public policy perspective, the courts' reasoning is sound. Many of these store
detectives and security guards are subjected to limited employment screening, have little or
no training, and go virtually unregulated in many states. See Boghosian, supra note 26, at
178, 187, 189,206,211.
604 [Vol. 26
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D. The Division of Labor
It is important to recognize that the world's ever increasing
population necessitates the existence of private police. This fact re-
sonates because there are certain areas of policing that should be kept
private because the public is better served. This is most clearly illu-
strated by viewing the administration of business entities situated on
mass areas of private property. Places like Disney World and private
university campuses are good examples. 61 The private nature of these
properties lends itself to private policing. It saves the public tax dol-
lars that would be allocated if governmental police were required to
patrol the Magic Kingdom or the Harvard University dormitories. It
allows the officers to focus on the nuances and intricacies of their en-
vironment without any outside influences. Further, modem society
sometimes requires the government to supplement its police work
with the private sector. 62 Typically, this is done through contractual
relationships. Recently, the Nassau County Department of Social
Services contracted with a private detective agency to help county in-
vestigators detect and pursue welfare fraud.63 A sociological theory
that is helpful in understanding this approach is the division of la-
bor.64 The theory posits that "the activity of policing extends beyond
what the public police do and includes the private police."65 By not
limiting the concept of police to prototypical governmental em-
ployees, one can fully understand contemporary reality. It is helpful
to see that in certain provinces, public police are best equipped to
handle the job. In some circumstances, the private police are superla-
tive. Still, in other situations, a combination of the two is optimum.
However, regardless of who is policing, there are certain minimal
constitutional protections that need to be afforded to people who en-
counter the police.
61 See Harvard University Police Department, http://www.hupd.harvard.edu/hupd over
view.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2010) (indicating that the Harvard University Police depart-
ment consists of special state police officers).
62 See Joh, supra note 1, at 51, 66 (noting that private police increasingly carry the same
police work as public police; thus, private police can no longer be viewed as "mere 'night
watchmen' ").
63 See Bruce Lambert, Audit Faults Nassau's Efforts to Combat Welfare Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2004, at B6.
64 Maksymilian Del Mar, Jurisprudence on the Frontline, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1095, 1100
(2008).
65 Joh, supra note 27, at 593.
2010] 605
13
Beaton: Counterparts in Modern Policing
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOURO LAWREVIEW
IV. STATE ACTION
A. Introduction and History
Throughout the existence of our nation, one question has been
raised when an individual or entity inflicts harm onto another person
or entity: Is the government in some way responsible? Justice Brad-
ley's articulation of the state action doctrine in The Civil Rights Cas-
es66 answers this question and is the genesis of the most fundamental
principle of American constitutional law. His primary premise is that
the prohibitory provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
operate only against state action and not against private action.67
This formulation is an application of the understanding that the Unit-
ed States Constitution generally is a restraint on governmental action
and does not provide one private citizen with rights against another.68
The proliferation of privatization has resulted in the majority of so-
ciety's injuries being caused by private entities, and not the hands of
government. 69 As a necessary consequence of this contemporary re-
ality, the Supreme Court, through many cases, has constructed a doc-
trine whereby a private individual or entity's actions can be attributed
to the government.70 The different principles will be set forth, fol-
lowed by the relevance of each to corporate investigators and other
segments of the private police.
66 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
67 Id. at 10-11 ("It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment.").
68 Id. at 11.
69 See Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors
Share the Sovereign's Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 221-222
(1997) (discussing the effect of privatization of governmental functions and the growing
trend of injured individuals seeking damages from "the private entities that have taken over
the government agency's operations").
70 See Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search
for Governmental Responsibility, 34 Hous. L. REv. 333, 336 (1997) (providing the backbone
for anybody interested in studying the intricacies of the state action doctrine).
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B. Public Function
Governments often delegate to private entities functions that
the government itself could perform.7 1 If a person is injured by a pri-
vate entity performing a governmental function, it may be argued that
the private entity did not hold itself to a constitutional standard. In
other words, but for the government's delegation of authority to the
private entity, no injury would have occurred. Citizens should not be
deprived of their constitutional protections and liberties simply be-
cause the government could not meet the needs of modern society.
The controlling test is, "whether the actor [in question] is performing
a traditional governmental function." 72 If found to be performing a
traditional governmental function, the private entity can be held ac-
countable for any injuries suffered as a result of its deprivation of a
constitutionally protected right.
To those wishing to impose § 1983 liability upon a corporate
investigator, the public function doctrine may appear as a blessing
furnished by the Supreme Court. 74 Further, Justice Stevens' dissent-
ing opinion in Flagg Bros seems like divine inspiration. He states,
in pertinent part, "it is clear that the maintenance of a police force is a
unique sovereign function, and the delegation of police power to a
private party will entail state action."76 As enticing as that language
may seem, it does nothing for a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim for
deprivation of his constitutional rights against the majority of the pri-
vate police.
Most corporate investigators and security personnel are not
n1 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (describing why constitutional
protections should be afforded in a company owned town); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,
468-69 (1953) (ruling on whether race based exclusions in a privately organized political
primary are constitutional); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974)
(holding that a private utility company was not a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment pur-
poses); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (analyzing the status of a private
school's discharge policies under the state action doctrine and "whether the school's action
... can fairly be seen as state action").
72 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621.
n See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509-10.
74 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-260 (1981).
" Flagg Bros, 436 U.S. at 178 (Stevens, J., Dissenting) (analyzing whether a creditor's
response in dealing with a debtor's property constitutes state action when the process was
statutorily approved).
76 Id. at 173 n.8. (emphasis added).
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delegated any police powers by the state.77 They are not labeled spe-
cial police officers, or "deputized" as police officers in certain con-
texts. Thus, an exorbitant amount of private police will be excluded
as state actors under public function jurisprudence. The Seventh Cir-
cuit, influenced by Justice Stevens, held in Payton v. Rush-
Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center7 8 that private police officers
licensed to make arrests could be state actors under the public func-
tion test.79 What about the overwhelming number of investigators,
detectives and guards who have not been granted statutory police
powers? Moreover, what are "police powers?" Notwithstanding the
ability to enact arrest and search warrants, the sole distinction be-
tween a regular citizen and an individual with "police power" is that
only the latter may make a felony arrest with solely "probable cause
to believe that a felony has occurred."80 That is, a citizen's arrest
power is limited to misdemeanors that are committed in the citizen's
presence and felonies that have in fact been committed.8 ' The public
function doctrine makes an arbitrary distinction between corporate
investigators and "deputized" private police personnel with aug-
mented arrest powers. A plaintiff will only be able to impose § 1983
liability against the latter.82 Furthermore, a persuasive argument that
defendant corporations will always have when confronted with a pub-
lic function argument in § 1983 litigations is that, historically, polic-
ing was private in character. Municipal police departments did not
rise until the mid 19th century.84
V. NEXUS THEORY-HOPE ON THE HORIZON
The nexus theory of state action jurisprudence is most benefi-
cial to courts in analyzing whether corporate investigators are state
n See, e.g., John B. Owens, Westec Story: Gated Communities and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 34 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1127, 1158 (1997) ("[Flagg Brothers] may not establish that
private police forces equal state actors, but it does illustrate Justice Stevens' view.").
7 184 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1999).
79 Id. at 630.
8o Sklansky, supra note 14, at 1184. See also Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 565 (1999).
81 Sklansky, supra note 14, at 1184.
82 Id. at 1186-87.
8' Id. at 1210-1211 (providing a great history of policing and its private roots in the United
States).
' Id. at 1206-07.
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actors for constitutional or civil rights purposes. The theory is com-
prised of the symbiotic relationship and state compulsion doctrines.
The importance of the nexus doctrine is buttressed by the Supreme
Court's arbitrary reliance on "police powers."8 5 The nexus doctrine
allows a corporate investigator without statutorily granted police
powers to be labeled a state actor in circumstances when he is work-
ing closely with governmental law enforcement. 86 The question un-
der the theory is: "When do the contacts between government and the
action of a private actor become so extensive that the action in ques-
tion may be fairly attributed to government? At some point along the
nexus continuum, the action of government and the private actor be-
come so intertwined that the courts will . .. pin the state action label
on the [private actor]."
State action exists through a symbiotic relationship when a
close nexus exists such that the private entity's actions automatically
belong to the state through their joint participation or an exchange of
mutual benefits. 8 Joint action may be defined as an "agreement on a
joint course of action in which the private party and the state have a
common goal" and act in furtherance of that goal. 89 A private citizen
comes within the reach of § 1983 liability only when "he is a willful
participant in joint action with the [s]tate or its agents." 90 Under the
state compulsion test, a private entity can become a state actor when
85 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 666 (1887).
By the settled doctrines of this court, the police power extends, at least,
to the protection of the lives, the health, and the property of the commu-
nity against the injurious exercise by any citizen of his own rights. State
legislation, strictly and legitimately for police purposes, does not, in the
sense of the constitution, necessarily intrench upon any authority which
has been confided, expressly or by implication, to the national govern-
ment.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
86 See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 ("But the inquiry must be whether there is a suffi-
ciently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that
the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.").
87 Buchanan, supra note 70, at 391.
88 See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (finding state action when a cor-
porate creditor and the government jointly participated in a challenged action); Burton, 365
U.S. at 724-26 (finding state action after observing the mutual benefits between governmen-
tal lessor and private lessee).
89 Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432,435 (7th Cir. 1986).
90 Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).
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it acted in a manner coerced or encouraged by the state. 91
While jointly participating, corporate investigators and go-
vernmental police have the classic symbiotic relationship. Private
corporations benefit through the relationship by strengthening the
foundation of their business through the removal and prosecution of
problematic consumers, employees, and clients. Governmental law
enforcement increases its productivity through an increase in arrests,
prosecutions, and convictions. This, in turn, garners the governmen-
tal police agency a stronger reputation in the community and in-
creased public support. Governmental law enforcement relies on
corporate investigators for easy access to corporate records and data-
bases without having to rely on the often arduous subpoena process.
Further, the government relies on the corporate investigators to in-
itiate and develop their cases. By dealing with governmental law en-
forcement and having the threat of punishment in the form of prose-
cution available to them, the corporate investigators can strengthen
their deterrence model. During interviews, the corporate investiga-
tors can utilize the threat of prosecution to extract confessions.
Perceiving the symbiotic relationship between governmental
law enforcement and the private police, some courts have relied on
these instruments of state action jurisprudence to impose constitu-
tional restraints upon corporations and their investigators.92 In Moore
v. Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C., the Michigan Court of Appeals uti-
lized the nexus doctrine to hold the security personnel of Motor City
Casino, a private entity, to be state actors and liable to plaintiffs un-
der § 1983.93 Moore is meaningful because the court found it neces-
sary to hold the casino security personnel to be state actors under the
nexus test; notwithstanding the lower court already holding "as a
matter of law" that they were state actors because they had statutorily
91 See e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,169-71 (1970).
92 See Stapleton v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 447 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Cal. 1968) (imposing
constitutional restrains on the actions of credit card company investigators while jointly par-
ticipating in search with municipal police officers). But cf Minnesota v. Buswell, 460
N.W.2d 614, 615 (Minn. 1990) (refusing to impose constitutional restraints on private secu-
rity agents who arrested and searched individuals, subsequently turning over evidence to the
public police for prosecution).
9 Moore v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C., 755 N.W.2d 686, 699-700 (Mich. 2008)
("[D]efendants' joint engagement with the Detroit [P]olice in the arrest and detention of
plaintiff also satisfies the symbiotic relationship or nexus test of action 'under color of state
law.' ").
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granted special police powers.94 The Moore decision reinforces the
premise of this article that courts should not solely rely on the Su-
preme Court's arbitrary distinction between private police with statu-
torily granted arrest powers and corporate investigators with no such
power. The latter also have the ability to deprive individuals of their
constitutional rights and protections.
In Moore, the "plaintiffs [unlawful] detention within the
locked casino security room commenced immediately after a com-
bined force of Detroit [P]olice [Department] officers and casino secu-
rity personnel confronted the plaintiff."95 Both the casino security
manager and the plaintiffs companion "testified that the Detroit
[P]olice ... authorized and indeed encouraged [the] . . . security per-
sonnel to seize plaintiff and escort him back to the casino." 96 "[T]he
state 'provided a mantle of authority' that constrained plaintiff to sub-
ject himself to detention by defendant."9 This was "not [simply] a
close working relationship between [the casino] security personnel
and the Detroit [P]olice officers." 98 This was "a joint and cooperative
effort to detain plaintiff either in a city jail cell or its casino equiva-
lent." 99 The court held that the defendant security personnel's "joint
engagement with the Detroit [P]olice in the arrest and detention of
plaintiff also satisfied the symbiotic relationship or nexus test of ac-
tion 'under color of state law.' "1oo The Moore court is but one of a
small number of decisions that have used the nexus test to find mem-
bers of the private police liable under § 1983.101
Many of the cases dealing with the constitutionality of joint
efforts between the public police and corporate investigators focus on
whether the private individual was an "agent of the government."l 02
94 Id. at 695, 698.
9 Id. at 699.
96 Id. at 691, 699.
97 Id. at 699.
9 Moore, 755 N.W.2d at 700.
9 Id.
1o Id.
101 See Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 834-35 (6th Cir. 2003); Murray v. Wal-
Mart Inc., 874 F.2d 555, 558-59 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[S]tate action is present when private secu-
rity guards and police officers act in concert to deprive a plaintiff of his civil rights . . . .").
102 Compare United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 845, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the Federal Express security employee was not to be considered an "agent of the gov-
ernment" when he illegally opened a package and found cocaine, subsequently turning the
package over to the Drug Enforcement Administration), with United States v. Walther, 652
6112010]
19
Beaton: Counterparts in Modern Policing
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOUROLAWREVIEW
This determination is a factual one and "must be made on a 'case-by-
case basis and in light of all of the circumstances.' "103 Due to the
subjective nature of a totality of the circumstances test, the results
have been inconsistent. 104 Likewise, analysis under the nexus theory
of state action jurisprudence is very fact intensive. However, the
nexus tests are theories separate and apart from general agency law.
Unlike agency law, the nexus theory does not require that "one per-
son . . . manifests assent to another person" to act on his behalf and
be subject to his control.105 Expressly or impliedly, manifestation of
assent to act on behalf of and under the control of the government is
not readily perceivable in a majority of the private/public police cas-
es. Most corporate investigators are acting on behalf of their corpora-
tion and have their company's interests in mind; not the interests of
governmental law enforcement. For example, in the aforementioned
examples, the eBay and IBM investigators were acting on behalf of
their own corporate interests; not strictly on behalf of the govern-
ment. Further, in many instances, corporate investigators regulate
and control the details of an investigation; sometimes the government
does not become aware of or get involved until a latter phase of the
investigation.106 In this instance, where a corporate investigator in-
itiates and conducts an investigation on his own volition-only noti-
fying governmental law enforcement of the case afterwards, a general
agency theory will not suffice in finding state action if the violations
occurred before the government became involved. Theoretically, it
should be easier to find the private police to be engaging in state ac-
tion under the nexus theory rather than an agency theory. The nexus
theory facilitates a finding of state action notwithstanding the private
corporations' personal interest in and control of the investigation.107
F.2d 788, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding an airline employee to be "an agent of the gov-
ernment" when she illegally opened plaintiffs package, violating the plaintiffs Fourth
Amendment rights).
"03 Koenig, 856 F.2d at 847 (quoting United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 739 (7th Cir.
1987)).
"0 See Walther, 652 F.2d at 791 ("[T]here exists a 'gray area' between the extremes of
overt governmental participation in a search and the complete absence of such participation
... [and that] the 'gray area' can best be resolved on a case-by-case basis.").
105 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
106 See Koenig, 856 F.2d at 845 (stating that a "Federal Express Senior Security Special-
ist" conducted an investigation of a suspicious package before contacting the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency).
107 See Feffer, 831 F.2d at 739 (stating that in determining whether an individual is an
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In 2001, the United States Supreme Court articulated a theory
of state action jurisprudence that has been labeled "pervasive ent-
winement."'08 The theory focuses on the overlapping identities of the
public and private entities involved. A challenged activity may be
state action "when it is 'entwined with governmental policies,' or
when government is 'entwined in [its] management or control.' "109
The analysis in Brentwood was "necessarily fact-bound," and the
Court found state action primarily because eighty four percent of the
private association's members were public officials.o In the private
police context, this theory may be helpful for a plaintiff who was in-
jured by a public police officer while moonlighting as a security em-
ployee for a private company.
VI. CASE LAW
A. The Supreme Court-Proper holdings with
Antiquated Legal Analysis
In the two instances where the United States Supreme Court
has dealt with the constitutional status of the private police, the Court
made the proper holdings but based its decisions on legal analysis
that is currently unsound and antiquated. In the two cases, the Court
found the private detectives to be state actors because they had been
granted statutory police powers. The Court was correct because it is
readily apparent that when a state legislature authorizes a person to
possess police powers, that individual should be labeled a state actor.
However, by neglecting to emphasize the contacts between govern-
mental law enforcement and the private detectives, the Court's rea-
soning offers little contemporary protection to individuals who have
had their constitutional rights assaulted by corporate investigators
agent of the state, the court must make a case-by-case analysis).
108 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001).
109 Id. at 296 (alteration in original) (citing Evans v. Newton 382 U.S. 296, 299, 301
(1966)).
no See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 298 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
939 (1982)).
"1 See Joh, supra note 27, at 605-07 ("The most recent and reliable national study esti-
mates that approximately 150,000 public police officers work in private policing jobs when
not on duty.") (internal citation omitted).
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without statutory granted police powers.
Williams v. United States"12 involved the actions of a private
detective who was hired by a lumber company to ascertain the identi-
ty of thieves."' 3 The issue was whether the private detective violated
the antecedent to 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 by using brutal and violent me-
thods to garner confessions.l14 The "thieves" were repeatedly beaten
with a rubber hose, choked with a sash cord, and temporary blinded
by bright lights." 5 A municipal police officer was also present for
the beatings."' 6 The Court held that the private detective was acting
under color of state law." 7 It focused its analysis on the fact that the
detective was designated as a special policeman in the City of Miami,
Florida." 8 Justice Douglas stated it was "common practice . . . for
private . . . detectives to be vested with policeman's powers."l 9 In-
stead, what if the private detective was similarly situated to most cor-
porate investigators and did not have a "special police officer
card[?]"l 20 Would the case have come out differently? Justice Doug-
las next averred that the "investigation [was] conducted under the ae-
gis of the State, as evidenced by the fact that a regular police officer
was detailed to attend it."' 2 ' This is the only statement in the opinion
that emphasizes the relationship between the private detective and the
public police, as opposed to the private detective and the state legisla-
ture. This is a precursor to the nexus theory of state action jurispru-
dence, and is a glimmer of hope for plaintiffs wishing to impose lia-
bility resulting from an investigation conducted by corporate
investigators without statutorily granted police powers.
In Griffin v. Maryland, the Court dealt with the issue of
whether a deputized private detective was in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment.122 While working for an amusement park, the
private detective enforced the park's policy of segregation by arrest-
112 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
"' Id. at 98.
114 Id at 98.
..s Id. at 98-99.
116 Id. at 99.
" See Williams, 341 U.S. at 100.
"' Id. at 98-100.
"9 Id. at 99.
120 Id. at 98.
121 Id. at 99-100.
122 378 U.S. 130, 131 (1964).
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123ing a group of African Americans for trespassing on the property.
Due to the "deputized" status of the private detective, the Court had
no trouble holding that he was a state actor for constitutional purpos-
es. 124 After Griffin, the Court left unanswered the constitutional sta-
tus of private police who are not deputized or otherwise given en-
hanced arrest powers from the state legislature. This Comment avers
that when the contacts on the nexus continuum between corporate in-
vestigators and governmental law enforcement reach a certain level,
the corporate investigators should be considered state actors for con-
stitutional and civil rights purposes.
B. Lower Courts-Failing the Adversarial System
The unwillingness of many lower courts to hold corporate in-
vestigators to a constitutional standard has failed both adversarial
parties of the American judicial system. Criminal defendants are un-
able to suppress inculpatory evidence that was obtained in a constitu-
tionally deficient manner by the private police. Accordingly, the
prosecution has access to confessions and contraband that unfairly
buttresses their leverages in plea bargaining and trial practice. In ad-
dition, promising civil rights plaintiffs are incapable of asserting civil
rights claims against the private police. As a result, individuals in-
jured by the private police are powerless.1 25
In many cases, a criminal defendant's most compelling argu-
ment is that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment should
preclude evidence procured from an unlawful search and seizure
from being presented against him at trial. 126 In United States v. Fran-
coeur, the defendants did not have access to this constitutional pro-
tection after being detained and searched with an indifference to
probable cause by members of the Walt Disney World Security
force.127 After a Disney employee allegedly saw a counterfeit bill in
one of the defendant's presence, the Disney Security force unlawfully
detained the defendants in a security office, searched and confiscated
123 Id. at 132-33.
124 Id at 132, 137.
125 The stark reality of a lack of remedial measures is supported by the fact that state tort
actions against the private police are strikingly rare and unsuccessful. See Slanksy, supra
note 14, at 1185-86.
126 Slanksy, supra note 14, at 1266.
127 547 F.2d 891, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1977).
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airline tickets, hotel receipts, and counterfeit fifty dollar bills.128 Be-
hind a one-way mirror, Disney employees then identified the defen-
dants to have passed counterfeit bills in their stores earlier that morn-
ing. 129  The United States Secret Service arrived and the Disney
Security force handed the evidence over to them on a silver platter.130
The defendants were subsequently convicted of passing counterfeit
U.S currency.' 3 ' The United States Supreme Court denied certiora-
ri. 132 If the Disney Security force "does not provide law enforcement
services," and only issues "Mickey Mouse traffic citations," why
were the officers in Francoeur detaining, searching, and implement-
ing identification procedures behind one way mirrors?l 33
Governmental law enforcement's duty to provide Miranda
warnings before custodial interrogations is meant to secure a person's
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Statements se-
cured by the government from a defendant in the absence of Miranda
warnings "may not be used by the prosecution in any proceedings
against the defendant."l 34 Individuals have no accompanying protec-
tion against compelled confessions when they are being interrogated
by the private police. In Grand Rapids v. Impens, the Michigan Su-
preme Court considered "whether a signed statement procured by
private security guards, one of whom was an off-duty deputy sheriff,
may be admitted into evidence against a defendant even though no
Miranda warnings were given."13 5 The court easily concluded that
the "security personnel who did not act at police instigation and func-
tioned without police assistance and cooperation are to be regarded as
private individuals." 36  The defendant's written confession was
deemed admissible into evidence and he was convicted. 37
128 Id. at 892-93.
129 Id. at 893.
130 Id.
13' Id. at 891.
132 Francoeur v. United States, 431 U.S. 932 (1977).
133 Sipkema v. Reedy Creek Imp. Dist., 697 So.2d 880, 882 (Fla. App. 5th Dist. 1997)
(discussing a high speed chase by officers of the Disney Security Force that resulted in the
tragic death of a young man).
134 City of Grand Rapids v. Impens, 414 Mich. 667, 672-73 (1982).
13 Id. at 670.
136 Id. at 677.
137 Id. at 670, 672.
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VII. NEXUS PLUS THEORY AND A CALL TO CONGRESS
In cases where investigations are jointly conducted by go-
vernmental law enforcement and corporate investigators, courts
should look to the nexus theory of state action jurisprudence. Though
not perfect, the symbiotic relationship and state compulsion doctrines
are workable. The theories entail a factual inquiry into the circums-
tances of each case. This Comment respectfully submits that, in ad-
dition, a "nexus plus theory" of state action analysis should be uti-
lized in joint investigation cases. Including all the aspects judges
already consider in making a state action determination, courts will
also look to a plus factor. The plus factor directly confronts and con-
siders the issues that arise with "new version of the silver platter doc-
trine." Courts will be aware of and factor into consideration the situ-
ation where evidence is procured by corporate investigators and
subsequently turned over to governmental law enforcement on a "sil-
ver platter." Under the nexus plus theory, it is highly relevant to the
state action analysis who obtained the statements, contraband, identi-
fications and other evidence. In searching for state action, courts will
heavily weigh the situation where corporate investigators turn over
evidence they obtained to the government. Unlike a general agency
theory, this nexus plus theory will find state action if the corporate
investigators acted on their own volition in procuring evidence in a
constitutionally deficient manner. Further, courts will also analyze:
the amount of interaction between the two entities, reasoning for inte-
raction; and possible overlapping identities.
In dealing with custodial interrogations by the private police,
Congress or state legislatures should get involved. A regulation re-
quiring all state-licensed security personnel to disseminate Miranda
warnings to subjects of custodial interrogations would remedy many
of the self-incrimination issues. In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren
stated:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alterna-
tives for protecting the [Fifth Amendment] privilege
which might be devised by Congress or the States in
the exercise of their creative rule-making capacities
.... We encourage Congress and the States to con-
tinue their laudable search for increasingly effective
ways of protecting the rights of the individual while
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promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal
laws.138
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Comment has shown the profound impact the private po-
lice have on modem American society. Their interaction with the
public police buttresses the government's ability to provide law en-
forcement. However, as this Comment has demonstrated, the private
police have the inherent ability to deprive individuals of their funda-
mental rights and freedoms. A broadening of the state action doctrine
will preclude the government from surreptitiously circumventing the
United States Constitution, and hold the private police accountable
for their actions. By utilizing a "nexus plus theory" of state action
analysis, courts will be well equipped to provide efficient state action
analysis in dealing with joint investigations between corporate inves-
tigators and governmental law enforcement.
13 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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